

VZCZCXRO8324
PP RUEHSK
DE RUEHC #5931 0511728
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 201713Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 4537
INFO NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2302

UNCLAS STATE 015931

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [MNUC](#) [PREL](#) [PRAM](#)
SUBJECT: UK TO HOST MULTILATERAL FUEL ASSURANCES
CONFERENCE MARCH 17-18 IN LONDON

REF: UNVIE 40

1. (U) This message provides guidance requested in Reftel.
See para 2.

2. (SBU) UNVIE is requested to approach UK Mission
interlocutors at the most appropriate level and convey the
following points:

-- The United States welcomes UK efforts to push forward the
adoption of multilateral fuel assurances, and we hope the
upcoming conference on "Multilateral Approaches to the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle" will be successful in educating the
participants and clarifying the relevant issues.

-- While the current UK draft is not, in general,
objectionable as a list of criteria that should be considered
as the discussion matures, we believe it will not be
practical to achieve consensus on a document of this
complexity in a two-day conference and could well prove
counterproductive.

-- Should principles be considered, they should be based on
broader conceptual areas of economic security, energy
security, and national security in a way that provides
transparency into the global nuclear market.

-- We believe an attempt to adopt so complex a text of
criteria on the sensitive issues raised by multilateral fuel
assurances could prejudice consideration of these issues in
the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) and could make it more
difficult to resolve them.

-- Tabling the current text could well turn the conference
into a drafting exercise, and amendments could be proposed
that would be unacceptable to either of our governments.

-- Attempting to negotiate a text could harden and reinforce
existing divisions on multilateral fuel assurances and make
it more difficult to resolve them at the IAEA BOG.

-- It could also be seen as a preview to the upcoming Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) decision on controls of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies and make it more difficult to get
the consensus decision the NSG is looking for.

-- An unsuccessful attempt to adopt a statement of principles
acceptable to all participants could give rise to the
perception that the conference had failed.

-- Given the linkages and the importance of this conference
at this critical juncture of the discussions, we therefore
urge the UK not to seek endorsement by the conference of a
statement of principles.

-- If, despite these concerns, the UK continues to perceive
the need for a public document, we recommend that the UK
issue a brief and broad set principles (rather than criteria

or a list of existing nonproliferation instruments) in a statement by the chair that would not require agreement by the participants.

If asked/as needed:

-- We could not, for example, accept any amendment to the text that explicitly or implicitly endorsed deflagging of nuclear material contributed to a fuel bank. Supplier states must be able to apply their export control laws to material they contribute.

-- Neither could we accept any language, in the context of NPT Article IV or otherwise, expressly legitimizing the transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technologies to states that do not already have these capabilities.

13. (U) Mission is requested to report the reaction of its UK counterparts no later than February 20. POC is Burrus (Buzz) Carnahan, ISN/NESS, 202-647-0689.
CLINTON